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Introduction 
Proposals for a basic income have a long history in which they have issued from all 
corners of the political spectrum- right, left and centre. But what marks their contemporary 
specificity is the link with a post-work, potentially ‘post-capitalist’ society. Propelling this 
conversation is the growing prospect of widespread automation, possibly of a large 
number of both blue- and white-collar jobs (Arntz, Gregory, and Zierahn 2016). 
Technological unemployment is predicted to follow, as robots replace workers (Frey and 
Osborne 2013). The argument goes that basic income responds to the retrenchment of 
the welfare state at the precise point jobs become scarcer, replacing the wage with an 
alternative payment independent of productive work.  
 But the solution is perhaps not as straightforward as this. Events in a pub in 
Berkshire two centuries ago let us know where the relationship between automation and 
the basic income might lead- and what it portrays is not a pretty picture. Through the 
famous reforms instituted at the Pelican Inn, Speenhamland, a prototype basic income 
was paid to those displaced by technological unemployment. But the payments preserved 
in aspic a fraught set of social relations, best seen, as we will suggest, in the example of 
the handloom weavers displaced by new weaving machines. By ensuring a minimum 
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level of subsistence it kept in place the misery of the state of things as they were, 
foreclosing their escape.  
This historical example, as we shall see, throws up evidence of unintended 
consequences concealed in current thinking around the basic income on the UK left and 
elsewhere. Basic income is no panacea for all ills, therefore. We conclude by assessing 
how introducing a stronger element of class struggle into contemporary visions of a future 
of automated worklessness might make their best consequences more realisable and 
their worst less likely than is implied in current prescriptions for the provision of a basic 
income. 
 
The ever-new is also the old lying close at hand 
Today, proponents of basic income see replacing labour with technology as less a threat 
than an opportunity. Moreover, among policymakers and mainstream theorists, the 
underlying assumption is that technology drives productivity enhancement and thus 
brings an automatic improvement of living standards. In a rehash of the orthodox Marxist 
dialectic between the forces and relations of production, radical advocates of basic 
income in turn argue that these benefits can only be shared if the social crisis of 
technological unemployment is solved with the provision of basic income.  
As we shall see, this presentation of the progression of history through the 
productive forces of a given society pushing against the social relations  under which 
production takes place is misguided. Postcapitalist theorists like Paul Mason (2015) put 
a lot of faith in the capacity of technology to deliver change. But technology is subject to 
the social context of its use. The simplistic positing of human progress through the 
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development of the forces and relations of production whitewashes both the dialectical 
co-constitution of the former in the latter and the latter in the former, and the continuing 
conditions of contradiction and antagonism that render them contingent.  
As this short reflection will consider, what the example of Speenhamland 
demonstrates is not the ‘dynamic’ side of the dialectic posited by Mason, where history 
unfolds on the path of progress, but what Adorno called its ‘static’ side, where the future 
stagnates in the persistence of the present. Adorno wrote that ‘at every moment the ever-
new is also the old lying close at hand. The new does not add itself to the old but remains 
the old in distress’ (Adorno, 2003: 94-5). Speenhamland suggests that the schemes for 
propelling history with automation and basic income may remain ‘stuck’ in precisely such 
a way, history unfolding not along a straight line but turning in on itself like the layers of 
an onion, at each stage increasingly pathological. 
The example of Speenhamland also serves as one type of example of what can 
happen when the state intervenes to help along or hinder history. In intervening, there are 
cases in which state policy can preserve the way things were inside the present, and 
contain the possibilities of the future in a distorted way also within the way things are now. 
An example of how technological development can be forestalled by the countervailing 
tendencies of state policy, and how it need not expel workers finally into the abyss of a 
systemic collapse, can be found in the example of Speenhamland. But rather than saving 
workers, the Speenhamland regulations give some glimpse of the contradictory outcomes 





The Labour Party and Poor Laws old and new 
Carried along on the pipedream of a development of the relations of production through 
the development of its forces, today we find the Labour Party at the centre of debate 
about free money and new machines. Inspired by the upswell in opinion behind the 
popularisation of the postcapitalist ideal through bestselling works like those of Mason 
and Srnicek and Williams (2015), the Labour Party has made tentative steps towards the 
embrace of a postcapitalist imaginary based in automation and the basic income (Stewart 
2016), most notably in Corbyn’s recent conference address extolling the ‘new settlement 
between work and leisure’ afforded by automation (Dickson 2017). This follows John 
McDonnell’s suggestion of 'Socialism with an iPad' (Wintour 2015), and Corbyn’s 
commitment to exploring the implementation of a basic income (Fenton 2016).  
This dovetails with its uptake in social-democratic think-tanks (Harrop 2016, 
Painter and Thoung 2016, Reed and Lansley 2016) and policy research institutes (Pearce 
2015), pilots and modelling exercises proliferate. Though sceptical of Corbyn, the 
intellectual forces behind centre-left policymaking have made themselves at home in the 
new ideological room he affords. Indeed, a recent exchange in Renewal between Neal 
Lawson of Compass and Mat Lawrence of the IPPR charts the course of this translation 
from the radical fringe to all wings of the social democratic centre left (Lawson and 
Lawrence, 2016). 
The debate in the Labour Party over a new approach to securing the self-
reproduction of workers in the face of instability echoes some of the historical conditions 
that led up to a debate that took place at the inception of the Labour Party as we know it. 
In 1908, the Minority Report of the Poor Law Commission, written by Labour MP and 
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future leader George Lansbury and leading Fabian Beatrice Webb, proposed the end of 
the Poor Laws and the implementation of new social policy protections against poverty 
(Thorpe 2001: 16). It was pivotal in coaxing the Fabians away from attempts to influence 
the Liberals and into the Labour fold, constituting the uneasy class and ideological 
compromise with which the Labour Party still contends today.  
The Poor Laws with which the report tussled granted limited support only on the 
assumption of individual responsibility for the fate of being poor, purporting to reward the 
actions of the recipients in seeking to rectify it. Their institution in 1834 responded to the 
failure of an earlier set of Poor Laws conceived in a place called Speenhamland, 
Berkshire, where, in 1795 at the Pelican Inn, local magistrates decided upon a series of 
provisions to grant ‘Parish relief’ to the poor and unemployed. This granted something 
like a proto-basic income to people out of work. And, crucially, it intersected with 
increasing automation and technological unemployment, carrying untoward 
consequences instructive to proponents of the basic income as a means to guarantee 
tech-aided postcapitalism today. 
 
World history knows no spectacle more frightful 
The Speenhamland regulations (Polanyi 2001: 81-107) give some glimpse of the 
contradictory outcomes basic income-style payments might achieve with reference to 
automation. And two great critics of political economy, Marx and Polanyi, are on hand to 
guide us through the realities of what happens when workers are paid not to work, and 
machines step in to take up the slack. The result was far from utopian. 
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As we shall see, this cautionary tale from history suggests that basic income may 
not be the answer without being part of a wider policy platform that harnesses labour 
struggle to address the complexities of concrete circumstances in the workplace and 
economic life.  
Working from the Royal Commission Report of the Poor Laws the Speenhamland 
reforms instituted, Marx (1976: 557-558) recounts how the payment of ‘outdoor relief’ (i.e. 
not conditional on attendance of the workhouse) to compensate low-paid workers 
according to their subsistence needs measured in bread led not to the liberation of hand-
loom weavers from painful competition with the power-loom, but exacerbated and strung 
out this competition in a deleterious way.  
Marx begins from the basis that machines present themselves as competition to 
the worker. By means of this competition, the valorisation of capital using machines rests 
on the destruction of workers’ ‘conditions of existence’. This is because the worker lives 
by selling their labour power. And, in a division of labour, this labour-power is tied to the 
specialized use of a single tool. If a machine steps in to handle this tool, the worker’s 
labour power can be driven below its value- and, crucially, it is through the selling of this 
labour power at its value that the worker acquires the means of living. Between handicraft 
and manufacturing, Marx writes, workers thus went under, or else flooded other areas of 
industry, increasing supply to the extent that the price of other workers’ labour power 
similarly dived beneath the value required to reproduce themselves.  
But what role did the ‘outdoor relief’ of Speenhamland play? Well, by making 
possible the paying of lower wages because the support of parish finances could be relied 
upon to take up the slack, employers used the Poor Laws to save on their outgoings and 
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make a greater profit. There was no reason to replace workers with machines all at one 
go because the cost of labour was so. This prolonged workers’ struggle against the 
incipient tendency toward automation via the power-loom. There was scant consolation 
to be derived from the temporariness and gradualness of the displacement of human 
labour by machines. As Marx suggested, ‘[w]hen machinery seizes on an industry by 
degrees, it produces chronic misery among the workers who compete with it’. 
Even where a rapid transition takes place, events are felt with an acute force. But 
even in these temporary instances, the pain is long and drawn-out, for, as Marx suggests, 
the nature of technological change is such that overhauls are constant and repeated. The 
struggle of the English hand-loom weavers illustrates the human cost of gradual 
automation, Marx wrote that ‘[w]orld history offers no spectacle more frightful’. Prolonged 
by the Poor Laws and the provision of parish relief to support or supplant altogether sub-
minimal wages, the hand-weavers’ ‘tragedy dragged on for decades’, locked in a 
competition with power-weaving machines they could not escape for the generous 
philanthropy of the state.  
Employers benefitted from keeping workers on at low cost in the last vestiges of 
the old ways of working. Or, being able to cast them adrift with impunity, safe in the 
knowledge that the parish would pick up the bill, whereby the unemployed ‘cringing wretch 
[…] lives on the debasing bread of charity’. The result of all this was that ‘[m]any of the 
weavers died of starvation [or] vegetated with their families for a long period on 2½d a 
day’. As Marx quotes a report stating, ‘the competition between the handloom and the 
powerloom is maintained out of the poor-rates’. The effect of this prototype basic income 
was to prolong the misery of technological unemployment, pickling in history a condition 
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which, were it not for the payments, workers might have been able to struggle against 
and escape more swiftly. There is every chance the basic income, implemented today, 
would do the same, keeping the cost of labour competitive with machines so that 
employers kept workers hanging on for longer than otherwise would be the case. 
 
Like potatoes in a pit 
Speenhamland also placed limitations on the commodification of labour. Polanyi (2001) 
famously critiqued the measure for obstructing the full formal freedom of workers to sell 
their capacity to labour to employers as equal parties to a contract, and hence holding up 
the development of capitalist social relations in semi-feudal England. Without a market in 
labour, workers have no independent means to acquire and bargain for the individual 
source of money that comes with the wage, relying instead on the patronage of the Parish. 
And, in a society already organised around the buying and selling of life’s necessities as 
commodities, the inability to commodify one’s labour power obstructs the ability to 
exchange the wage for the things that one needs to live. A crisis in the commodification 
of labour, therefore, is simultaneously a ‘crisis of social reproduction’ (Caffentzis 2002, 
Bakker and Gill 2003, Leonard and Fraser 2016, Gill 2016)- in other words, of the capacity 
of humans to reproduce the conditions to go on living and working, individually and 
collectively. If the basic income proves only to be enough to prevent this, and not enough 
to comfortably live on, then a nightmare combination of prolonged competition with 
machines and the infringed commodification of their labour could follow. 
Later historians have reiterated and expanded upon these criticisms. Hobsbawm 
and Rudé called Speenhamland ‘a disastrous alternative to the simple increase in basic 
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wage-rates’ (1969: 47). EP Thompson described it as a system that had ‘a single 
tendency: to destroy the last vestige of control by the labourer over his own wage or 
working life’. The costs of labour became increasingly paid through poor rates, rather than 
wages, and ‘the southern labourer had been reduced to total dependence on the masters 
as a class’. Thompson quoted a labourer in a Speenhamland county who said that the 
farmers ‘keep us here [on the poor rates] like potatoes in a pit, and only take us out for 
use when they can no longer do without us’ (1968: 247-8).  
Inspired by Polanyi, the fashionable political economist Wolfgang Streeck (2014) 
suggests we today witness a crisis of labour’s commodification sparked by the self-same 
conditions the basic income purports to solve. Commodification has preceded so 
completely that labour, and its ability to be successfully commodified, has been 
undermined by unhealthy habits of overwork and the fetishization of work for its own sake. 
In response, capital takes steps to institute ‘a new allocation of time between social and 
economic relations and pursuits’, and a ‘new time regime with respect to labour’ based 
around flexible working, home working, the blurring of leisure and work and so on. This 
is out of recognition that, in order for the commodification of labour to proceed apace new 
‘limitations must arise’ that ‘centre on the increasingly demanding claims made by the 
employment system on human labour’. The basic income is but one of a suite of policies 
targeted at the resolution of this crisis. But it risks swinging the balance in the other 
direction, rendering impossible the commodification of labour in a world still organised on 
the basis of the commodification of everything else. 
Speenhamland was an experiment in a kind of basic income today proposed: one 
that heals over the contradictions of a changing capitalism. Whilst many commentators 
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have drawn the link, positively or negatively, between parish relief and the basic income 
(Coppola 2014, Skidelsky 2015), its legacy and relevance to the example of basic income 
is contested by others (Blaug 1963; Baugh 1975; Block and Somers 2003, Bregman 
2016). 
But these reassessments of the Speenhamland system have been mostly directed 
towards effectively refuting the arguments of Thomas Malthus and the Royal Commission 
Report.  Malthus and the Royal Commission, like right-wing opponents of basic income 
or welfare systems in general today, rested their criticisms of relief systems like 
Speenhamland on the grounds that they undermined the poor’s self-discipline and 
willingness to work. A more detailed look at the historical record suggests that parish 
reliefs did not, in fact, hurt incentives or productivity in the manner assumed by its liberal 
critics (Block and Somers 2003). 
However, the distinct argument made by Marx and Polanyi that Speenhamland 
acted as a wage subsidy and hurt the bargaining power of labour is not as clearly refuted 
by these newer assessments. In fact, while aligning himself with the ‘revisionist’ account 
of Speenhamland, George Boyer (1990) argues that it was used by employers to maintain 
workers while wages declined, discouraging rural labourers from migrating to the cities 
where they would have higher wages and greater bargaining power. On top of this, they 
used it to secure idle labourers for occasional work in a context of rapidly accelerating 
seasonal unemployment. It can be imagined that basic income would serve a similar 
function for employers who are increasingly turning for forms of insecure and temporary 
employment of workers. Finally, even if Speenhamland reliefs did not have some of the 
direct effects ascribed to it, at the very least they failed to prevent an increasingly 
12 
 
desperate situation for the rural labouring communities who received them. While 
parishes faced an increasing fiscal burden as employers used ‘the Poor Law to pass 
some of the cost of securing a peak-season labour force on to the non-labour-hiring 
taxpayers’ (Boyer 1985, p. 454), living standards for rural labouring families declined in 
the context of falling or stagnating wages and deteriorating employment prospects. Areas 
in which Speenhamland was most extensively in place were among the worst affected in 
the country.  
 
Conclusion 
What the tale of Speenhamland shows is that basic income may not be the response to 
automation and technological unemployment its proponents suggest. In fact, it may 
embalm the current low-skilled, low-pay, low-enjoyment economy for longer than would 
otherwise be the case. For the basic income to have the synergistic impact with 
automation its proponents desire, it would have to be coupled with other state policies to 
regulate into existence new forms of class struggle over new technology and the economy 
as a whole so that the desired ends- of a new and radically restructured relationship with 
working life- could be achieved without the human costs wrought unwittingly by the 
seemingly generous provisions of parish relief under the Poor Laws. Emboldening class 
struggle by, for instance, stimulating and supporting the creation of new kinds of worker 
organisation and liberalising anti-union laws, would address productivity from a system-
wide perspective largely unaddressed in tech-utopias of the right, left and centre.  
The irony is that at the precise time proponents of postcapitalism are heralding a 
new age of technological advance, persistently low productivity is a major problem and 
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barrier to growth. Some arguments even claim that innovation is grinding to a historical 
halt rather than propelling the world forward into a gleaming future (Gordon 2016). As one 
Financial Times contributor quips, the problem is not too many robots, but too few 
(Sandbu 2017). This is because what happens in the workplace is not a silo, and wider 
trends impress themselves negatively upon productivity at this level. Today, employers 
raise value by exploiting workers not through productivity increases but over the terrain 
of an extended working day and weakened terms and conditions. Non-enforcement of 
employment regulation aids them, as the state enables such policies and practices and 
trade unions defend contractual rights in only a slender few sectors. This easy means of 
turning a fast buck on the backs of low-paid, precarious labour disincentivises business 
investment in productivity-raising measures. Why spend money on new technology when 
you can shaft a worker for less? Interestingly, it is this paradox that confronts the sunny 
optimism of the postcapitalist literature, its dreams carried atop a wave of automation the 
social basis of contemporary capitalism stifles at source. Short of technical 
superintendence, the skills of workers suffer in turn, a self-fulfilled prophecy likely only to 
prolong and worsen the productivity crisis in which Western economies are mired. 
Meanwhile, the monies saved from non-investment in skills and productivity allow firms 
to add to huge surpluses accumulated only so as to spend out on share buybacks and 
shareholder dividends (Thompson 2013). Accumulation of capital grows faster than the 
real economy, worsening the disparities in power and wealth between capital and labour 
(Piketty 2014) 
In this respect, the productivity crisis is directly expressed in the widening 
inequalities to which the world is subject. Automation, even augmented by a basic income 
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pitched at just the right level on which to scrape by, runs the risk of hollowing out the 
labour market further. It runs the risk of automating precisely the skilled jobs in, say, car 
production, that pay well and reward skill, creating a surplus of cheap labour elsewhere 
that will be increasingly soaked up in the un-automatable provision of services and luxury 
consumption to the rich who sit pretty on a glut of accumulated wealth still devoid of 
profitable routes of investment as the world remains hooked on low-wage production in 
poorer countries where the cost benefit of replacing workers with machines is minimal at 
best. 
 Hence, the only productivity that counts is a factor of wider pressures that stem 
from the uneven hand employers have over their employees in a society riven by class 
division. It is the control and power employers wield over low-paid, precarious labour that 
stymies the kind of business investment necessary for greater productivity in a society 
that knows no other kind. Anything that violently restores the balance wields more force 
over how best we use our time than the insipid, struggle-free homilies hip alternatives 
present today. Class struggle, as President Roosevelt realised with his spur to organised 
labour in the New Deal years, is an effective promoter of productivity gains (Ferrari Bravo 
2014). The more workers struggle for higher wages and a better work-life balance, the 
cheaper and more necessary seems the implementation of new technology. The irony is 
that the postcapitalist prospectus presumes to accomplish full automation without this 
conflictual prehistory- a contradiction in the very terms on which the whole platform 
presents itself. 
 In a society constituted in antagonistic class relations, it seems strongly likely that 
for the foreseeable future the gains of automation will be shared unequally. It is supposed 
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in most imaginaries that robots will replace those for whom work is most menial and 
unfulfilling- unskilled repetitive work with scant reward or status accrued to it. However, 
the precise feature that renders this work so desirable to escape from the perspective of 
the workers beholden to it- its low pay, which is simultaneously its low cost to the 
capitalist- is precisely that which makes it less worthwhile to automate. Why pay a robot 
more when a human can work for less? Why shell out on new technology to extract 
marginal productivity gains from workers who could not be paid any less for the little they 
do produce? Owing to their higher cost, it is just as likely that we will see more 
professional, technical and intellectual labours liberated from the wage relationship first 
of all. 
 Confronted with work that is highly paid but automatable, capitalists may be more 
motivated to explore the cost-effectiveness of technological replacements than they 
would when confronted by service workers slaving in bullshit jobs with race-to-the-bottom 
wages. But the workers unlucky enough to be stuck with all the unabolished bullshit jobs 
would find themselves locked in a state-supported competitive struggle with robots, the 
basic income acting as a hand-out to stay in the game and survive, in work or on standby, 
only so long as capital needs you.  
In this, they may find themselves much like the handloom weavers who were 
embalmed in competition with the powerloom by the apparently generous provision of 
parish relief in the late 18th century Speenhamland reforms.  
Stressing the dynamic side of history’s dialectic and not its static side, the 
optimistic outlooks of those pinning their hopes on technological development to deliver 
us from lives of drudgery run up against the prospect that, if not complemented by 
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substantive changes in power relations and social and economic organisation, machines 
will only serve to increase ‘technological unemployment’ at one end and embalmed 
servility at the other, and, with the further weakening of bargaining power of labour relative 
to capital, the prospect of more poverty and drudgery still. What is therefore needed is an 
intensification of labour organisation and active class struggle should the post-work 
dreamers within the Labour Party wish to have their way. The most sophisticated among 
their ranks, like Nick Srnicek, recognise this (see Mayo, Srnicek and Davies 2017). But 
more work must be done to move the conversation past mere conformity with a 
technological unfolding that may or may not happen. 
What the example of Speenhamland and the hand-loom weavers shows is that 
without this, the payment of a basic income in the context of automation may not 
strengthen the hands of workers after all, but weaken it. History has a habit of playing 
tricks on us. Way back when, the reaction to the purported failure of Speenhamland 
burdened the country with the Poor Law Reforms, a cold-hearted and repressive husk of 
social policy that swung too far in the other direction. Those in the Labour Party proposing 
the basic income today should be careful what they wish for. From the basic income 
springs the sense that we have been here before. Events at a Berkshire pub two centuries 
ago foretell what can go wrong. 
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